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Article 3

Daniel Callahan*

Commentary

Competency in Medical Caret
There can be no doubt that one of the greatest achievements of
medicine is the successful application of a scientific methodology
to both basic biomedical research and clinical application. The
Flexner Report of 1910, and the increasing application of scientific
thinking to medical problems that came in its aftermath, are the
principal reasons for the success of contemporary medicine. The
triumphs of biomedical research are real and obvious, and the radical improvements in mortality and morbidity data since the turn
of the century provide all the evidence one could ask for about the
efficacy of scientific medicine. Nonetheless, as we move into an era
of chronic disease, and apparently past the point where inexpensive vaccines or cures for widespread disease are still likely, we
will be forced to reevaluate some aspects of the efficacy of scientific medicine, and also take a fresh look at some of the problems it
may have caused.
Among those problems has been a sharp sundering of the technical from the human side of medicine, and in particular on that
aspect that bears on the care of human beings as a whole. Competency in medical practice has come to connote almost exclusively
the ability of a physician, or other health care worker, to bring to
bear on the treatment of illness a rational, analytical method and a
careful deployment of scientific skills. To be "competent" means,
in effect, to be a good technician. That is the general thrust of contemporary medical education. It is a clear message that one can
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gain by examining medical journals, and a general attitude well in
keeping with a society that prizes scientific knowledge and its application to human problems.
Just as the history of much twentieth century philosophical and
scientific thought has been marked by an allegedly sharp chasm
between the "is" and the "ought," between facts and values, so too
there has developed an equally great chasm in medical practice
between the supposed empirical solidity of scientific medicine in
the diagnosis and treatment of illness, and the far more subjective,
relatively intractable side of medicine represented by subjectivity,
personal values, and medical ethics. The former are thought to be
"hard," and the latter "soft." That phenomenon is hardly unique to
medicine, but cuts through much of our contemporary thinking.
An important consequence, however, is that it has helped to abet a
general tendency to ignore the whole person and to focus instead
on particular illnesses or organ systems, and to be relatively indifferent to all of those personal and subjective factors that influence
the way patients are actually treated, or at least the way they perceive their treatment.
Viewed crudely, one might well ask just what difference does it
make anyway, and why ought one not worry exclusively about the
scientific side of medicine? That kind of an attitude might make
perfectly good sense if one's aim is to vaccinate people against a
plague or a cholera epidemic. There the aim is to save as many
lives from a potentially fatal disease as possible, and the personal
relationships, or the desires of patients, are relatively unimportant.
But in an era of chronic illness, where people are not going to be
saved readily or inexpensively, and where death will be for most
people a long drawn-out phenomenon, an exclusively technological
attitude is not only conducive to professional insensitivity, but is
not likely to meet the genuine needs of patients.
If it was ever valid in the past to distinguish sharply between
the technical and the human side of medicine, that distinction is
no longer tolerable. Put more pointedly, it is impossible to say that
a health care worker is competent if that person is not able to grapple effectively with the moral problems involved in medical care, or
able to deal with the human dimensions of that care. Every medical decision, either tacitly or explicitly, must find an appropriate
blend between the technically correct course of treatment and that
which is morally defensible. In almost no case will it be utterly
irrelevant to ask for the technically appropriate approach, and in
almost no case will it be irrelevant to ask what the best moral
course would be. The major difficulty will be to find the right blend
between the technical and the moral.
Implicit within this is the assumption that it is of the essence of
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morality to ask the question: what is the good of human beings?
That broad question encompasses such issues as choosing that behavior that most advances the human good, determining how to
make decisions in the face of conflicting possibilities of the human
good, and in deciding what character traits or virtues are most conducive to a seeking and an achievement of the good for human beings. Inevitably, any attempt to define an ultimate good will be
problematical, and probably controversial, at least in a pluralistic
society; but that social reality does not absolve us of a responsiblity to make the effort. It also will force us to grapple with such
fundamental questions as the nature of human life, the meaning of
such concepts as "health" and "illness," and the relationship
among physical, psychological, and spiritual or philosophical
goods.
In a medical context, moral questions arise both implicitly and
explicitly. They arise implicitly when, in making what seems to be
an obvious treatment decision, we affirm a set of values that may
be widely shared but rarely articulated. No one, for instance, will
ordinarily start a moral debate about saving the life of an otherwise perfectly healthy child who is the victim of an accident when
it is easy and inexpensive to do so (or even when it is not). It is
taken for granted that saving the lives of healthy children is a valid
moral enterprise, and anyone involved in such a decision would
immediately move to the technical problems in doing so, not pausing for a moment on the underlying ethical conditions that stimulate a decision to treat in the first place.
In those morally obvious cases-"obvious" at least because of a
general social agreement-medical competence will be displayed
not simply in having the correct values, but much more dominantly in those simple situations involving a choice of the right
methods of treatment. The real and only issue in such cases is the
technically appropriate course of action, not the morally appropriate course. The technical methods chosen simply implement and
bear out the basic moral decision, and the technically best decision
then becomes the morally best means to achieve the good of a particular individual.
At the other extreme, of course, would be situations in which
there was great uncertainty about the appropriate moral goal to be
sought (e.g., whether to keep alive a very elderly, debilitated, vegetative patient), and perhaps also about the appropriate technical
means to achieve a hazy moral goal. Indeed, when one looks at the
wide range of possible medical decisions-on people of different
ages, physical conditions, religions, and so on-it makes considerable sense to think in terms of a continuum. At one end of the continuum would be those decisions that command universal, or
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almost universal, moral agreement, leaving the only important issues those that bear on the best technical care. Saving a life of a
dying healthy child, or setting the broken leg of a healthy adult,
would fall on one end of the continuum. At the other end of the
continuum would be decisions where the moral good was uncertain, and perhaps the technical choices no less uncertain even if
one could determine the moral good to be sought. The most difficult ethical dilemmas, of course, are those where one is in doubt
about what will genuinely serve the welfare of patients, and the
dilemma is made all the more complicated if there are a number of
treatment possibilities available as well. A decision, for instance,
that would involve some kind of trade-off between the mere extension of life, and a shorter life without the radical disfigurement that
might be the result of some life-extending surgery, would pose an
enormously difficult choice, blending in an exceedingly complex
fashion the technical and moral aspects.
To envision the decisionmaking mix between the technical and
moral aspects of medical care as part of a continuum by no means
solves the problem of how one ought to determine the extent to
which a particular medical problem ought to be seen as essentially
moral, or essentially technical. In their enthusiasm to break down
a fact-value dichotomy, some commentators like to argue that all
medical decisions are essentially nontechnical. Even in the most
obvious kinds of situations-that of saving the lives of healthy babies-there is a fundamental moral choice made, even if not stated.
All medical decisions, viewed that way, are moral decisions, and
the technical always remains secondary. That is probably true
enough; but it is not a very interesting truth. For it is no less a fact
that the technical does exist, that technical decisions must be
made, and that the range of technical options available will in great
part determine the possibilities for advancing human welfare. If
the moral shapes the technical, we ought to know from contemporary medical practice that the technical possibilities shape the
moral choices as well.
The care of the chronically ill, or of the dying, pose some of the
most difficult kinds of questions. For in both of those cases one
knows that there is nothing that medicine ultimately can do to
save the life of a patient, and that it is simply a matter of caring for
the patient in the most effective way possible when the eventual
outcome--death-is known with certainty. In the case of the
chronically ill, death may not be imminent at all, but many months
or even years into the future. In the case of those we determine to
be terminally ill, death will be more imminent. In either situation,
however, the main point will be to choose those technical means
that will provide the best comfort and care, and the highest quality
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of life, compatible with the fact of an inevitable end. That is a particular challenge to medicine, because the ethos of technical
medicine is to treat aggressively with the most sophisticated
means-means which, in the case of the chronically ill, may be perfectly inappropriate to achieving their moral or spiritual welfare.
A brief commentary of this sort is not conducive of a detailed
examination of the myriad problems that confront anyone who
tries to find the right balance between moral and technical considerations in the providing of "competent" care. Suffice it to say that
medical training that does not introduce students vigorously and
rigorously to that issue will be remiss. Since all medical decisions
will entail some value commitment or other, the more conscious
the understanding of those values the more likely it is that the care
given will be appropriate to the patient. In some cases, the choice
will be very difficult. Competency, therefore, can be defined not
simply as an ability to master and manipulate technological means
of providing cures, but also the capacity to relate those technologies to the needs of individual patients, through some view of the
good of human beings, and in the light of some method of relating
moral and scientific values.
That is an enormously difficult task, and the notion of competency suggested here is not one that is easily achieved. Nonetheless, if we can at least agree that a notion of competency that
focuses exclusively on technical skills is an inadequate one, and
perhaps as likely to do harm as to do good, we would at least have
made a great advance, and set the stage for a different way of treating patients in the future. For all of its services in the past, an excessively technical outlook on medical care is not likely to be
appropriate in light of a rapidly aging population, a growing proportion of the chronically ill, and a citizenry that is increasingly
conscious that it must make medical decisions in the light of personal and social moral values.

